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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
PRIVATE PAPERS
Craig M. Bradley*
Introduction
Until 1967 the mere evidence rule limited the objects of searches
and seizures to "fruits and instrumentalities" of a crime. This rule pro-
vided special, if illogical and arbitrary, constitutional protection to pri-
vate papers, as they were rarely fruits or instrumentalities of crime.'
But in 1967, in Warden v. Hayden,2 the Supreme Court decided that
the fourth amendment permitted searches for "mere evidence!' This
holding, although it was based on sound logic, diminished both the
number and type of searches prohibited by the fourth amendment.'
In the decade after Hayden this diminution continued as the
Court further expanded the government's ability to gather evidence.'
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
A.B., University of North Carolina 1967. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law
1970. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Patrick Baude,
Thomas Schornhorst, and Alexander Tanford for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
' In addition, because of their testimonial nature, the production of private
papers was barred by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. See Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886) (statute providing for the compulsory pro-
duction, in a civil case brought by the government, of the defendant's books,
invoices, or papers relevant to the proceeding violates self-incrimination clause). In
recent years the Court has interpreted this holding of Boyd very narrowly. See text
accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
See id. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 312 (Douglas, J., dissenting); text
accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
4 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (fifth amendment does
not bar summons directing petitioner's accountant to turn over tax records held by
the accountant because the amendment is a "personal privilege" which cannot be
asserted by the accountant); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (neither
fourth nor fifth amendment bars summons to attorney to produce work papers of
his client's accountant turned over to the attorney by the client); Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (neither fourth nor fifth amendment prohibits search of an
individual's office for, and seizure of, business papers prepared by the individuail
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This trend culminated in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,' in which the
Court upheld the issuance of a warrant to search the office of a stu-
dent newspaper for photographs that were evidence of a crime, even
though there was no claim that either the photographer or the newspa-
per was involved in any criminal activity.
Zurcher and the other post-Hayden cases6 have broadened the
scope of both who can be searched and what can be searched for, thus
raising serious questions about whether private papers, particularly
those of non-culpable individuals, are entitled to any constitutional
protection beyond the usual fourth amendment requirement of a
search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. The thrust of
the Court's opinions from Warden through Zurcher is that any evi-
dence, even the most private of papers, held by any individual, even
one totally uninvolved in crime, is subject to search and seizure upon a
proper showing of probable cause and specificity. Nonetheless, the
Court has explicitly stopped short of such a holding. In Zurcher the
Court recognized that "[a] seizure reasonable as to one type of mate-
rial in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with
respect to a different type of material" 7 And in Fisher v. United
StatesI in which the Court upheld an IRS summons for the tax
records of petitioners' accountants, it noted that "[s]pecial problems
of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary
... are not involved here" 9 Thus, on the one hand the Court seems to
have done away with any special protections that private papers may
have enjoyed in the past. On the other, it has been unwilling to concede
that there may not be certain types of papers which should be ac-
corded special protection.
In Fisher the Court stated that "the prohibition against forcing
production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
6 See note 4 supra.
1436 U.S. at 564, quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973). This
qualification refers to seizures of specific types of papers, as the Court's discussion of
Roaden and Stanford v. Texas, 378 U.S. 476 (1965), makes clear. 436 U.S. at 564.
9 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
9 425 U.S. at 401 n.7. See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43, 444
n.6 (1976) and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971), in which the Court
avoided the question of the propriety of seizing private papers.
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rationale.. ' !"I It is the purpose of this Article to offer such a ration-
ale and to suggest the rule of law which should be followed when the
government desires to search for and seize diaries, datebooks, tape
recorded notes, and other purely private communicative materials.
This discussion, which involves a consideration of the diminution of
the fourth and fifth amendment protections for such materials, con-
cludes that certain private communications, because they are the phys-
ical embodiment of the mental process, should be entitled to special
protection under the fourth amendment.
I. The Decline of Constitutional Protections
A. Fourth Amendment Protections:
The Mere Evidence Rule
To understand the diminution of the fourth amendment's protec-
tion for private papers it is first necessary to realize how extensive that
protection once was. Protection of private papers from governmental
search and seizure is a principle that was recognized in England well
before our Constitution was framed. The most eloquent statement of
the principle is found in the British case of Entick v. Carrington,"
which the Supreme Court has cited as the source of the framers'
understanding of the term "unreasonable searches and seizures."' In
Entick the Secretary of State issued a warrant authorizing a search of
the house of John Entick, allegedly the author of certain seditious
,o 425 U.S. at 409.
11 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765). An abbreviated report of the case appears at
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). For a discussion of the significance of Entick in American
constitutional law, see J. LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 29, 53-55, 59-60 (1966).
,2 In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court declared:
As every American statesmen [sic], during our revolutionary and for-
mative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this [case] and
considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it
may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of [the
framers] and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was
meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 626-27.
19811
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papers. Entick was arrested and all of his papers were seized, including
many which bore no relation to the charge. Entick sued the agents of
the Secretary of State for trespass and won before a jury. The King's
Bench upheld the verdict. The Court, in an opinion by Lord Camden,
reasoned that "every invasion of private property.., is a trespass"
and it was therefore "incumbent upon the defendants to shew the law,
by which this seizure is warranted."' 3 Because "private papers are the
owner's goods and chattels" ' no trespass could be justified, for such a
search would violate the supremacy of the owner's property rights. 15
Searches for stolen goods, on the other hand, were permissible since
such goods were not the property of the subject of the search.
Thus "privacy" in Entick was simply an offshoot of the right to
private property: no one had a right to trespass on another's land and
seize the landowner's property, regardless of what sort of warrant he
or she might possess. Papers, as chattels, were protected along with
other personal property. The reasoning of Entick was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States. ' In Boyd the
lower court had ordered that certain business records of the appellants
be produced in connection with an ongoing forfeiture litigation with
the government. The appellants complied with the order under protest
and sought review of the resulting forfeiture judgment. The Supreme
Court held that the order to produce the papers violated both the
fourth and fifth amendments.' 8
1 19 Howell's St. Tr. at 1066.
1, Id.
Is Id.
6 Stolen goods were considered the property of the owner from whom they
were stolen. See id. at 1067.
" 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"Id. at 634-35. To find a violation of the fourth amendment, it was necessary
for the Court to conclude that the order constituted a search or seizure. The Court
concluded that it did because it "effect[ed] the sole object and purpose of a search
and seizure." Id. at 622. This reasoning is highly questionable because a subpoena is
less intrusive than a search. It may be that the Court found it necessary to rely on
both the fourth and fifth amendments because the papers at issue had not been pre-
pared by appellants but by the firm that had shipped the glass which was the subject
of the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 619. The papers were only self-incriminatory in
the sense that it would be necessary for appellants to authenticate them in court.
Thus, arguably, neither a search nor self-incrimination was present in Boyd.
The observation by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Couch v. United States, 409
[Vol. 16
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The Supreme Court later described the Boyd holding thus:
[W]arrants "may be resorted to only when a primary right
to such search and seizure may be found in the interest
which the public or the complainant may have in the prop-
erty to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, . . !'
[or when] the property is an instrumentality or fruit of
crime, or contraband. Since it was "impossible to say...
that the Government had any interest" in the papers
involved "other than as evidence against the accused. .. "
"to permit them to be used in evidence would be, in effect,
... to compel the defendant to be a witness against him-
self?"'9
Thus, the papers in Boyd were held immune from seizure for two rea-
sons: first, as the private property of the appellants, they were pro-
tected by the fourth amendment; second, since they were testimonial
in nature, they were protected by the fifth amendment. The Court
stated that "in this regard the fourth and fifth amendments run almost
into each other.'20
Boyd established in the American constitutional lexicon the
"mere evidence rule" based upon the right to private property that was
recognized in Entick. Only contraband or fruits and instrumentalities
of a crime were subject to seizure.2' If an individual's private property
U.S. 322, 348 (1973), that "Boyd emphasized that the invoice there was a private
paper written by the defendants" is incorrect. While Boyd emphasized that the
invoices were appellants' private papers, the opinion states that the invoice in ques-
tion was "'from the Union Plate Glass Company... ." 116 U.S. at 619.
19 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302 (1967), quoting Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, 311 (1921).
20 116 U.S. at 630. For an interesting discussion of the Boyd opinion and its
subsequent abandonment by the Supreme Court, see Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd:
Self Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343
(1979). That Article, focusing as it does on the "moral autonomy" aspects of the fifth
amendment, covers substantially different ground than does this Article.
11 Instrumentalities differ from contraband in that the defendant clearly has a
property interest in the former. The reason that instrumentalities were seizable was
explained in an article which was later relied on heavily by the Supreme Court in
overturning the mere evidence rule. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303, 309
(1967). The article stated:
19811
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were merely evidence of a crime it could not be seized, however rele-
vant it might be to an ongoing criminal investigation. The right to pri-
vacy was thus assured by the Constitution's protection of property.
2
Yet the rule, although a comfortable reaffirmation of the princi-
ple that "every man's home is his castle, ' 23 led to irrational results by
The requirement that the object seized be an instrumentality of crime owes
its existence to the principle that such articles are forfeit to the government,
which in turn seems to be derived from the deodand of the early common
law. In the 13th century a metaphysical fault was imputed to an inanimate
object such as a wagon or sword which had caused an injury. This fault
made the object a deodand which could be seized, condemned, and after
purification sold by the Crown.
Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man ' Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALF. L.
REv. 474, 478 (1961).
1, The early decisions were clearly based on property rights and hence equally
applicable whether papers or articles of clothing were involved. Still, they seem to
have been influenced by a special regard for private papers. Thus in Entick the Court
declared:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec-
tion; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a tres-
pass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret
nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand
more considerable damages in that respect.
19 Howell's St. Tr. at 1066. In Boyd the communicative nature of the items seized
provided the fifth amendment basis for the decision. And in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), the case which originated the exclusionary rule, the Court
stated:
The case ... involves the right of the court in a criminal prosecution
to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the
accused, seized in his house (without a warrant) .... If letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citi-
zen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th amendment ... might
as well be stricken from the Constitution.
232 U.S. at 393.
11 "'The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is made part of our con-
stitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures . . .'
Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.S. at 390, quoting T. COOLEY, CoNsrrrtrioNA LMI-
TATIONS 425-26 (1874).
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forcing the courts to exclude relevant evidence of crime which had
been seized pursuant to otherwise lawful searches.24 For example, in
United States v. Richmond,25 clothing which shpported an on-the-
scene identification of the defendant was supppressed2 6 because the
defendant's clothing was his property and not a fruit or instrumental-
ity of a crime. Similarly, in Morrison v. United States,27 a handkerchief
"which allegedly bore some tangible evidence of [a sex] offense" was
suppressed.28 Other courts struggled to find that objects were an
instrumentality of a crime in order to establish their admissibility. For
example, in United States v. Guido9 the court found that a bank rob-
ber's shoes were admissible as an instrumentality of the crime because
they "would facilitate a robber's getaway and would not attract as
much public attention as a robber fleeing barefooted from the scene of
a hold-up." 0o
In addition to excluding relevant evidence of crime, the mere evi-
dence rule failed to satisfactorily protect privacy. In Olmstead v.
United States'' the Court held that the warrantless wiretapping of exte-
24 The rule was widely criticized. See articles cited in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. at 300 n.7. But the issue was not totally one-sided. See United States v. Poller, 43
E2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.):
mhe real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that
invasion of a man's privacy which consists in rummaging about among his
effects to secure evidence against him .... [L]imitations upon the fruit to
be gathered tend to limit the quest itself, and in any case it is something to
be assured that only that can be taken which has been directly used in per-
petrating a crime.
25 57 E Supp. 903 (S.D. W Va. 1944).
26 Id. at 907.
27 262 E2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
28 Id. at 450-51. "The handkerchief was merely evidentiary material. It clearly
was not the instrument or means by which the crime was committed, the fruits of a
crime, a weapon by which escape might be effected, or property the possession of
which is a crime." Id. See also United States v. Lerner, 100 E Supp. 765, 768 (N.D.
Cal. 1951).
29 251 E2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
30 Id. at 3-4. See also Morton v. United States, 147 E2d 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945) (blood-stained clothing of a murder suspect held admissi-
ble without discussing the mere evidence rule).
", 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19811
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rior phone lines by federal agents, "without any trespass on the prop-
erty of the defendants, 3 2 did not violate the fourth amendment.33
Increasingly sophisticated technology had made it possible to intrude
upon even the most private sanctuaries without physical trespass, leav-
ing the subject without legal recourse. It became apparent that the
mere evidence rule did not realistically balance the needs of law
enforcement and the privacy rights of the individual. The rule, there-
fore, had to be abandoned. This finally occurred in Warden v.
Hayden.34
In Hayden the police, acting upon information that an armed
robber "wearing a light cap and a dark jacket"35 had entered a certain
house, followed him inside in "hot pursuit. 36 The officers spread out
32 Id. at 457.
"Id. at 466. This decision gave rise to the famous dissent of Justice Brandeis in
which he deplored the limitations of fourth amendment protections to physical prop-
erty:
[O]nly a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. [The framers of the Constitution] sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men. To protect that right every unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34 387 U.S. 294 (1967). For an insightful discussion of how the developing phi-
losophy of legal realism led to the abandonment of the mere evidence rule, see Note,
Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 944 (1977). The Note, in proposing that
"all private testimonial evidence" should be absolutely immune from seizure, essen-
tially adopts the solution offered by Justice Marshall's dissent in Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 344 (1973). For criticism of this proposal, see notes 116-17
hfra.
387 U.S. at 297.
36 Curiously, the Court's opinion in Hayden, frequently cited by the Court as
originating the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g.,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971), never used that term; it
appears only in Justice Fortas' concurring opinion. 387 U.S. at 310-12. Nevertheless,
the "hot pursuit" element of Hayden was deemed controlling by the Court even
though the state court had upheld the search because the owner of the home had
given the police permission to enter. 387 U.S. at 297-98 n.4.
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through the house and found Hayden in an upstairs bedroom, feign-
ing sleep. He was arrested when another police officer reported find-
ing no other man in the house. Meanwhile one officer, attracted to the
bathroom by the sound of running water, found a shotgun and a pistol
in the flush tank. Another officer who "was searching the cellar for a
man or the money"37 found a jacket and trousers in a washing
machine which matched the clothing description given by a witness to
the crime. Ammunition for the gun was found in Hayden's bedroom.
All these items were introduced against Hayden at trial."
The court of appeals considered itself bound by the mere evi-
dence rule to suppress this evidence and reversed the conviction by a
2-1 vote. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, Justice Brennan overturning
the mere evidence rule on the ground that "the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than prop-
erty:'4 Because the search was proper, it followed that the seizure of
any evidence, whether fruit, instrumentality, or mere evidence, would
not create any greater intrusion upon the suspect's privacy,41 and con-
sequently was permissible.
The Court was careful to distinguish this case from the seizure of
private papers:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not 'testimo-
nial' or 'communicative' in nature and their introduction
therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness
against himself in violation of the fifth amendment. This
case thus does not require that we consider whether there are
31 387 U.S. at 298.
38 Id.
Hayden v. Warden, 363 E2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Judge Bryan, dissenting, argued that the clothing would have been seizable if Hayden
were still wearing it. Consequently, the dissent would not have allowed Hayden's dis-
robement to immunize his clothing from seizure. Neither the majority nor the dissent
seemed enamored of the mere evidence rule.
10 387 U.S. at 304.
" Judge Learned Hand had expressed his awareness of this proposition years
before, see note 24 supra, but had nevertheless supported the mere evidence rule for
the pragmatic reason that "limitations on the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the
quest itself." United States v. Poller, 43 E2d at 914. Justice Brennan rejected this
rationale in Hayden, pointing out that "privacy 'would be just as well served by a
1981]
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items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them
from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure. 2
While the Court thus reserved the question of whether papers were
seizable, it nevertheless removed one of the two constitutional bul-
warks that had protected private papers from seizure.4 3 Hence-
forward, papers which were more likely to be "mere evidence" than
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime could receive special protection
only under the fifth amendment, if at all. This appeared to open the
courthouse door to all papers which had not been prepared by the
defendant, because production of such papers does not involve
self-incrimination.
While Hayden was based upon sound logic, three Justices were
disturbed by the holding, apparently recognizing, as had Judge Hand
nearly forty years before, 4 that however illogical the mere evidence
rule was, it served to limit the scope of searches. Justice Fortas, joined
by the Chief Justice, concurring, suggested that the mere evidence rule
should be maintained, but avoided in this case, by arguing that
use of identifying clothing worn in the commission of a
crime and seized during "hot pursuit" is within the spirit and
intendment of the "hot pursuit" exception to the
search-warrant requirement. That is because the clothing is
pertinent to identification of the person hotly pursued as
being, in fact, the person whose pursuit was justified by con-
nection with the crime.'5
This argument was no more satisfactory than the Seventh Circuit's
claim in Guido" that a bank robber's shoes were an instrumentality of
restriction on search to the even-numbered days of the month.' " 387 U.S. at 309,
quoting Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Mans Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 474, 479 (1961). Given that the basis of the fourth amendment was
now to be privacy and not private property, this analysis was certainly correct.
41 387 U.S. at 302-03 (citation omitted).
41 Later, in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court recognized
that the abolition of the mere evidence rule "washed away" the foundations of the
traditional fourth amendment protection for private papers. Id. at 409.
" See notes 24 & 41 supra.
45 387 U.S. at 312.
46 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958).
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the crime because he could not run away without them. Since mere
evidence would not have been seizable under a warrant, it would be
nonsensical to permit its seizure under an exception to the warrant
requirement.
Justice Fortas was straining to find a way to preserve the mere
evidence rule because he recognized that despite its problems it had the
effect of protecting privacy by prohibiting general searches. He argued
that "in gratuitously striking down the 'mere evidence' rule, which dis-
tinguished members of this Court have acknowledged as essential to
enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general searches,
the Court today needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of
liberty's heritage." 7 Similarly, Justice Douglas, dissenting, declared
that the fourth amendment, which had been undermined by the
majority, "creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the
police through raids, by the legislators through laws, or by magis-
trates through the issuance of warrants!" ' The fears of the minority,
that the Court's decision would tend to limit the protection of the
fourth amendment and allow any evidence, including private papers,
to be seized pursuant to a valid warrant or one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement, were reinforced as the Court
began to chip away at the other bulwark which had protected papers,
the fifth amendment.
B. The Fifth Amendment Protections
Six years after Hayden, the Court, in Couch v. United States,49
held that a taxpayer who had given her tax records to her accountant
could not invoke the fifth amendment against a summons directing the
accountant to turn over the records to the IRS because the
self-incrimination privilege "is a personal privilege!" ' Because the
summons was directed only to the accountant, it followed that there
was no compulsory self-incrimination of the taxpayer. Boyd was dis-
tinguished because in that case the privilege was asserted by the person
in possession of the papers. 51
41 387 U.S. at 312.
4 1 Id. at 313.
"' 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
5o Id. at 328 (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 330.
19811
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Three years later, in Andresen v. Maryland,2 the Court removed
the final barrier to seizure of private papers. In Andresen government
agents obtained a warrant to search the petitioner's office for docu-
ments pertaining to a real estate fraud. Papers found in the search
were used against the petitioner at trial. The conviction was affirmed
on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part to resolve
a conflict in the circuits over "whether documentary evidence not
obtainable by means of a subpoena or a summons may be obtained by
means of a search warrant. 53
While conceding that under Boyd the petitioner could have
invoked the fifth amendment to resist a subpoena for the documents
in question, the Court found that fact irrelevant. The vice of such a
summons, that "the very act of production may constitute a compul-
sory authentication of incriminating information," was not present in
the execution of a search warrant where the petitioner was not
required to do or say anything.54 The broad statement of Boyd that the
"seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is [not] substantially different from compelling him to be a
witness against himself" was dismissed as dictum."
In summary, the Court in Andresen conceded that there was
compulsion, because the search involved a forcible entry onto petition-
er's property, and that there was self-incrimination, because the docu-
ments prepared by petitioner incriminated him. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that there was no compulsory self-incrimination
because the petitioner was not compelled to prepare, produce, or
authenticate the documents.56
32 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
Id. at 470 n.5.
s, Id. at 474.
I d. at 471. Because Boyd, unlike Andresen, involved a summons, this obser-
vation was correct.
56 The Court, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964),
discussed the "policies undergirding the privilege:"
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspirations: our willingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; ... our respect for the inviolability of
[Vol. 16
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Thus the traditional constitutional protections for private papers
were swept away. As a result the fourth amendment appears to provide
protection only insofar as a warrant must be obtained or a valid excep-
tion to the warrant requirement found. Papers are subject to search
and seizure regardless of whether they are fruits and instrumentalities
of a crime or "mere evidence" The fifth amendment provides protec-
tion only against compulsory preparation or production of one's own
papers. This protection, however, because it cap. be avoided by use of a
search warrant, is largely meaningless." The constitutional protections
having been withdrawn, private papers are no more likely to be
excluded from evidence than any other item.
Or are they? A lingering doubt persists. Andresen repeatedly
adverted to the fact that the documents in question were "business
records '58 and limited the holding to such records. 9 Furthermore, in
Fisher v. United States,6" despite the fact that the Court upheld under
the authority of Couch6 an IRS summons directing an attorney to
the human personality and the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life" . . . ; ... and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to
the innocent!'
427 U.S. at 476 n.8. The Court then pointed out that seizure of a pre-existing written
statement endangers none of the values which the fifth amendment was designed to
protect. Id. at 476-77.
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether a taxpayer's accountant's workpapers could be subpoenaed from the
taxpayer's attorney. It conceded that the subpoena constituted compulsion and that
the papers might be incriminating. However, the Court concluded that the mere act
of handing over papers prepared by someone else did not constitute compulsory self-
incrimination. Id. at 411-13.
, But not entirely. Because a search may only be conducted upon probable
cause, whereas a subpoena may issue with no showing of cause, the refusal of the
Court to sanction subpoenas of one's private papers does provide limited protection
in cases where the government lacks probable cause to believe that the papers in ques-
tion are in one's possession or probable cause to believe that they are evidence of a
crime.
58 E.g., "This case presents the issue whether the introduction into evidence of a
person's business records, seized during a search of his offices, violates the Fifth
[Amendment]... "' 427 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 477.
60 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
61 409 U.S. at 322.
19811
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produce documents prepared by his client's accountant and delivered
to him by his client,62 the Court was careful to note that "[s]pecial
problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a per-
sonal diary, United States v. Bennett, ... are not involved here' 63
In Bennett,"' Judge Friendly had harked back to Judge Hand's
statement in United States v. Poller:65
Judge Hand's... statements afford the best clue to the for-
mulation of any new limitation that we have been able to
conceive. As he observed, the vice lies in the unlimited
search. The reason why we shrink from allowing a personal
diary to be the object of a search is that the entire diary must
be read to discover whether there are incriminating entries;
most of us would feel rather differently with respect to a
"diary" whose cover page bore the title "Robberies I Have
Performed." Similarly, the abhorrence generally felt with
respect to "rummaging" through the contents of a desk to
find an incriminating letter would not exist in the same mea-
sure if the letter were lying in plain view. 66
While Judge Friendly offered no solutions, he brought to light the
problem which has been lurking at the back of the Court's collective
6' 425 U.S. at 396-98. Fisher held that simply passing the documents to the
attorney did not increase the client's protection under the fifth amendment; i.e., that
the attorney-client privilege does not provide protection for pre-existing documents in
addition to that provided by the fifth amendment. The Court also decided that even
if the petitioner had possessed the papers himself he could not have resisted the sub-
poena. Id. at 409-11.
6" 425 U.S. at 401 n.7, citing United States v. Bennett, 409 E2d 888 (2d Cir.
1969). At the conclusion of the opinion the Court again observed that "[w]hether the
Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in
his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not
his 'private papers,' see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 634-35.' 425 U.S. at 414.
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, found the decision
"another step in the denigration of privacy principles settled nearly 100 years ago in
Boyd... "' Justice Brennan argued that the above statement by the Court implied
that the privilege might not apply to private papers and was therefore "contrary to
settled constitutional jurisprudence." Id. at 414-15.
"409 E2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
"43 E2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930). For Judge Hand's statement, see note 24 supra.
"409 E2d at 897.
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consciousness for decades. Given that "mere evidence" logically
should be the proper subject of a search and admissible at trial, as
Hayden has held, is there something special about private papers
which nevertheless protects them from seizure and renders them inad-
missible? A search for private papers seems no more intrusive than the
search of Andresen's office for his business records or the search of the
bureau drawer in Hayden's house, yet the Court seems to indicate that
there might be something about such papers, although it cannot or wiUl
not say what distinguishes them from Hayden's clothes or Andresen's
"business records!'
The key distinction does not seem to come from the fifth amend-
ment. Despite the reservations expressed in Fisher and Andresen, the
thrust of those opinions is that diaries, datebooks, letters, and other
papers of the most private nature are not protected any more than
were Andresen's business records. Certainly it is no more self-
incriminating to record evidence of a crime in a diary than in a busi-
ness record. And a search for such a diary involves no more compul-
sion than does a search for business records.
C. Third-Party Searches
Before a solution to the question of what protects private papers
from searches can be presented, a recent development which further
endangered the privacy of personal papers must be discussed. So long
as mere evidence could not be seized, the question of who could be the
subject of a search was a relatively easy one. Anyone in possession of
contraband or fruits or instrumentalities of a crime presumably had a
sufficient nexus with that crime, and the government had a sufficient
interest in the property, that no serious objection could be raised to a
reasonable search for such objects, even if the person to be searched
was not directly implicated in the crime.67
But what if an innocent third party had mere evidence of a crime
which was his or her own property? Prior to Hayden, the government
had no superior property interest in the evidence and it could not have
been seized. After the Court abandoned the mere evidence rule and the
67 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 577-83 (1978) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
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"ancient, fictitious forfeiture theory,"68 the question arose whether a
person could be subject to search and seizure for evidence of a crime in
which that person was not involved. In Zurcher the Court allowed
such a search.
Zurcher arose when Palo Alto police obtained a warrant to
search the offices of the Stanford Daily, the Stanford University stu-
dent newspaper. The newspaper had published a story with photo-
graphs of a student demonstration in which nine policemen had been
assaulted. The warrant was issued on the finding that there was proba-
ble cause to believe that other photographs taken by the newspaper
photographer might reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the
assaults. The search, which the Supreme Court assumed arguendo was
within the scope of the warrant, uncovered no such photographs and
nothing was seized. 9
The newspaper, alleging an infringement of first, fourth, and
fourteenth amendment rights, filed a civil action against the police and
other officials in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The district court"0 denied the request for an injunction but
granted declaratory relief on the ground that the Constitution requires
that "law enforcement agencies cannot obtain a warrant to conduct a
third-party search unless the magistrate has probable cause to believe
that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable" 7' The Court of
Appeals affirmed per curiam.72
The Supreme Court formulated the issue as "how the fourth
amendment is to be construed ... where state authorities have proba-
ble cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of
crime is located on identified property but do not then have probable
cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself
implicated in the crime. . . -7" Because it would normally be impossi-
"1 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.ll (1967).
19 436 U.S. at 550-52.
70 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 E Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per
curiam, 550 E2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
1' Id. at 132. The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that it must be shown
that the possessor of the materials sought would disregard a court order not to
remove or destroy them. 436 U.S. at 552.
72 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547
(1978).
1 436 U.S. at 553.
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ble for the state to meet the "severe burden" of showing the impracti-
cality of a subpoena, the Court reasoned, "the effect of the [District
Court's] rule is that fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of a crime
may be recovered from third parties only by subpoena, not by search
warrant '74
The Court swiftly disposed of the issue:
Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search
any property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at
which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instru-
mentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found. Nothing on
the face of the [Fourth] Amendment suggests that a
third-party search warrant should not normally issue. The
Warrant Clause speaks of search warrants issued on "proba-
ble cause" and "particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In situa-
tions where the State does not seek to seize "persons" but
only those "things" which there is probable cause to believe
are located on the place to be searched, there is no apparent
basis in the language of the Amendment for also imposing
the requirements for a valid arrest-probable cause to
believe that the third party is implicated in the crime."
Not only may "any property" be searched but anything which "consti-
tutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense" may be
searched for.7" Consequently, anyone who possesses such evidence
may be the subject of a search. This new development, the susceptibil-
ity of innocent third parties to searches and seizures, and hence to
11 Id. The Court later added that requiring the government to proceed by means
of a subpoena would also raise fifth amendment issues of the sort which were
avoided by the use of the search warrant in Andresen. That is, the party subpoenaed
might, in some cases, be able to resist the subpoena on the ground that production
and authentication of the documents subpoenaed would be self-incriminatory, a
claim not available in the case of a search, as Andresen had held. 436 U.S. at 561-62.
" Id. at 554 (emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 558, quoting FED. R. Crumv. P. 42. The Court concluded that absent
some showing of abuse, the mere fact that the warrant was for a newspaper office did
not violate respondent's first amendment rights. Id. at 563-67.
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searches and seizures of their private papers, has made the need for
special protection of such papers even more acute.
The Zurcher Court seemed to separate the two clauses of the
fourth amendment." Because, according to the Court's analysis, any
place can be searched for anything, one might conclude that any
search authorized by a valid warrant is now approved; that is, no
search pursuant to a warrant valid under the second clause can be
ruled "unreasonable" under the first. Under this logic the subject mat-
ter of the search, provided only that it be evidence of a crime, will
never render the search unreasonable.
Yet, as in Fisher and Andresen, the Court explicitly stopped short
of the result compelled by the decisions' own logic:
This is not to question that "reasonableness" is the overrid-
ing test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to
assert that searches, however or whenever executed, may
never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on
probable cause and properly identifying the place to be
searched and the property to be seized.7 1
That is, certain searches may still be "unreasonable" even though they
conform to the procedural requirements of the second clause of the
fourth amendment.
What are those searches? And what is the meaning of the empha-
sis on business papers in Andresen and the reservation of diaries in
Fisher? It is doubtful that the Court had a clear notion of why a diary,
for instance, should not be subject to the same logic which rendered
the business papers in Andresen and the photographs in Zurcher sub-
ject to seizure. The Court was wrestling with the angel of privacy. The
Justices had not forgotten Lord Camden's admonition from two cen-
" The first clause secures the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . .. ." The
second clause provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." For the argument that the framers clearly
intended that the two clauses be independent, see Justice Douglas' dissent in Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 297, 312 (1967).
"' Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978).
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turies before that "'papers are the owner's ... dearest property.'" 9
Indeed, in Zurcher Justice White, writing for the majority, observed
that "the net gain to privacy interests by the District Court's new rule
would [not] be worth the candle,"8 implying that a rule which did sig-
nificantly advance privacy interests might be met with more accept-
ance. It is the purpose of the rest of this Article to frame such a rule,
one that is consistent with Andresen and Zurcher, but which neverthe-
less provides a constitutional foundation for protecting that which we
hold most private.
II. Constitutional Protection for Private Papers
In order to formulate a rule for the protection of private papers
under the fourth amendment, it is necessary to consider exactly what
should fall within the rule. As discussed earlier, some papers seem
more worthy of special protection than others. A diary entitled "Rob-
beries I Have Performed," for instance, seems a more suitable candi-
date for search and seizure than does the diary of Anne Frank."
The Supreme Court's determination that the framers incorpo-
rated a balancing mechanism into the fourth amendment provides the
means for determining which papers deserve special protection. In
Zurcher, the Court emphasized that "[t]he fourth amendment has...
struck the balance between privacy and public need....,82 Moreover,
the Court explained that the public's interest in enforcing laws and
recovering evidence is the same regardless of the identity or culpability
of the person searched. 3 Assuming that the public interest is a con-
stant, the only variable remaining in the fourth amendment calculus is
the individual's interest. An attempt must therefore be made to iden-
79 Id. at 577 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19
Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
80 436 U.S. at 562.
, 'See text accompanying note 66 supra.
82 436 U.S. at 559. See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978), and
cases cited therein.
11 436 U.S. at 555. The Court has never taken the position that the seriousness
of the crime under investigation or the importance of the evidence sought should
have any impact on fourth amendment rights, although there is no inherent reason
why these factors could not be included in the calculus.
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tify those papers in which the individual has the greatest privacy
interest.
Although communications to others, such as letters and phone
calls, are undoubtedly a vital part of functioning successfully in soci-
ety,84 they are not completely private because at least one other person
is involved. Once an individual mails out a letter or transmits a phone
call, his or her expectation of privacy in the thoughts expressed has
been abandoned; the communication has become the property of
another. The recipient may choose to show a letter to a friend, use it
against the author in a lawsuit, or give it to the police. Similarly, the
recipient of a phone call can record it or allow another to listen in.
Knowledge that the communication may be so used has already caused
the originator to limit his or her freedom of expression. Consequently,
the Supreme Court has had no difficulty, when other requisites of the
fourth amendment were met, admitting letters obtained with the per-
mission of the recipient,85 and phone calls obtained by wire-tapping
pursuant to a proper warrant, 6 into evidence against their originators.
The most private matters are one's own thoughts and the physical
embodiment of those thoughts in the form of communications solely
to oneself. These would include a diary, a reporter's notes of an inter-
view or of a news event, and a doctor's tape recording of his or her
11 It is for this reason that Professor Tribe argues that the "right to privacy"
must include "freedom to have impact on others." L. TRImBE, A ME CAN CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW §15-1 (1978). For the purposes of this Article, a much narrower aspect
of privacy, the "right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from govern-
ment surveillance and intrusion," is considered. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599
n. 24 (1977), quoting Kurland, The Private , U. Cm. MAGAzNEM 7, 8 (Autumn
1976). See dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 469 (1928).
" See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White the Court
conceded that the maker of a phone call may have an expectation of privacy as to his
conversation but held that that expectation of privacy may be frustrated if the recipi-
ent has allowed the police to listen to the other end of the conversation. Obviously,
any rule which attempted to protect the expectation of privacy of one party to a letter
or telephone conversation would be difficult to enforce and might unconstitutionally
restrict the other party's freedom.
Communications to others may, in certain circumstances, be protected by the
first amendment. Any such protection is based upon the content of the communica-
tions, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
86 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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thoughts and diagnoses following examination of a patient. Such mat-
ters, as long as they are not passed to another to read or transcribe, 7
are nothing less than the record of one's own thinking and should be
considered as private as the thoughts themselves. Whether they are
kept for personal or business reasons is irrelevant. It is the individual's
expectation of privacy which is at issue, not a judgment as to the
nature of the thoughts.
Having defined "communications to oneself" as the most private
of private papers,88 the sanctum sanctorum of the personality, the
question then is to what constitutional protection these papers are en-
titled. Although other constitutional amendments protect privacy in
various ways,89 the fourth amendment must provide any special pro-
tection for private papers9" for the concern here is with a limitation
upon the power of the state to search for, seize, or subpoena private
papers. The question which must therefore be resolved is how to bal-
ance the privacy needs of the individual against the law enforcement
needs of society, the issue the fourth amendment has always pre-
sented.91
Lord Camden's announcement in Entick v. Carrington" that
"papers are the owner's ... dearest property"9 3 seems to indicate that
", A greater degree of privacy protection for thoughts which are not passed on to
others may be analogized to the attorney-client privilege. Communications between
attorney and client are privileged only so long as the client does not disclose them or
put them in issue in court. E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 91 (2d ed. 1972).
8 The term "private papers" in this Article encompasses all recorded communi-
cations to oneself in any medium, including, for example, tape recordings and video-
tapes.
'9 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
oFisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), is not to the contrary. The Court
in Fisher, in holding that an attorney may be required to release tax records trans-
ferred to him or her by clients, see notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra,
explained that "there is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other
forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall
within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized:'
425 U.S. at 407, quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). Yet the
Court recognized that different types of papers may deserve different degrees of pro-
tection. 425 U.S. at 401 n.7.
"See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
Id. at 1066.
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private papers occupied a preferred position, compared to other "mere
evidence," in the law of search and seizure. This tradition was contin-
ued in Boyd,9" where the Court, in striking down a summons for the
appellant's business records, revealed that the basis for protecting
papers is not strictly a property interest, but also a privacy interest.
The Court held:
It is not the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummag-
ing of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and private property [which
offends the Constitution]. Breaking into a house and open-
ing boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to con-
vict him of crime [violates the Constitution]."
Yet as discussed at the beginning of this Article, the fourth and
fifth amendment bases of Boyd have both been undercut in recent
years.96 Consequently, the most that seemed to be left of Boyd was a
prohibition against a subpoena to an individual to produce his or her
own papers.97 But Boyd stands for more than this. Still viable is the
Court's holding that a search for private papers is an "invasion of the
indefeasible right of personal security,"98 as to which the breaking and
entering are merely "circumstances of aggravation." Although such a
search may not involve testimonial compulsion, as the Court now
, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" Id. at 630. This passage or part of it is quoted in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 391 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-67 (1961).
96 See text accompanying notes 3-10 & 49-66 supra.
9, See id. at 414. The Supreme Court has conceded that the fourth amendment
is applicable to subpoenas to a limited degree. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). But, as the Court recognized in Fisher, a subpoena to
an individual to produce his or her own records might be barred by the fifth amend-
ment even though a search for those papers would have been permissible. 425 U.S. at
409-10. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 561 n.8. See also Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973).
91 116 U.S. at 630.
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views the fifth amendment, it is clear under Boyd that a search for
private papers may be an unreasonable invasion of the right to privacy,
notwithstanding the fact that other "mere evidence" can now be
searched for pursuant to a proper warrant.
In Katz v. United States,99 the Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.' 0
The private papers discussed in this Article are more deserving of spe-
cial protection than the telephone conversation discussed in Katz
because the individual in Katz already freely disclosed his thoughts to
at least one other party.'"' But the principle of Katz, that the fourth
amendment is a key source of protection for private communications
and that it offers protection for matters as to which an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, is equally applicable to the argu-
ment advanced in this Article. Indeed, because the expectation of pri-
vacy in private papers is greater than in living rooms or phone booths,
the fourth amendment should reflect these expectations by offering
greater protection for communications to ourselves.
A search for private papers may be no more physically intrusive
than a search for a gun, but the psychological intrusion is far greater,
because the searcher is invading not only the subject's house but his or
her thoughts as well. The impact of a search and seizure of private
papers is analogous to that experienced by the individual who is
arrested and jailed. What happens, in effect, in a seizure of private
papers, is that the individual's thoughts are arrested:'" the thoughts,
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
,o0 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301
(the fourth amendment "was intended to protect against invasions of 'the sanctities
of a man's home and the privacies of life,' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630,
from searches under indiscriminate, general authority").
,0' See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
,02 That is, the seizure and examination of the papers has an impact on the indi-
vidual which continues after the search is over. When a gun is seized, the individual's
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like an arrested person's body, are in the possession of the authorities.
If the seizure of papers is viewed in this manner, the solution suggests
itself immediately: if the authorities desire to seize private papers, they
must be able to make a double showing of probable cause. That is, not
only the usual probable cause required for a search, that the subject
matter of the search is evidence of a crime, but also the probable cause
necessary to effect an arrest, that the individual subjected to the search
is involved in the crime in question.' 3 Only then can such a serious
intrusion be justified.'""
privacy is not further intruded upon by its seizure. But when papers are seized, the
private thoughts recorded on them can be read by the authorities and introduced into
evidence, and may even be published.
0I The Court in Zurcher made it clear that probable cause to arrest is not nor-
mally a necessary concommitant of a valid search. 436 U.S. at 558. But the Court
was speaking in general terms and was not addressing itself to the question of what
additional showing might be required to justify a search for private papers, when, in
essence, a seizure of the person's thoughts is involved.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Zurcher distinguished between the protections
which should be afforded to the culpable as distinguished from the non-culpable sub-
ject of a search:
Of greatest importance, however, is the question whether the offensive
intrusion on the privacy of the ordinary citizen is justified by the law
enforcement interest it is intended to vindicate. Possession of contraband
or the proceeds or tools of crime gives rise to two inferences: that the custo-
dian is involved in the criminal activity, and that, if given notice of an
intended search, he will conceal or destroy what is being sought. The proba-
bility of criminal culpability justifies the invasion of his privacy; the need to
accomplish the law enforcement purpose of the search justifies acting with-
out advance notice and by force, if necessary. By satisfying the probable
cause standard appropriate for weapons or plunder, the police effectively
demonstrate that no less intrusive method of investigation will succeed.
Mere possession of documentary evidence, however, is much less likely to
demonstrate that the custodian is guilty of any wrongdoing ....
436 U.S. at 581. Judge Friendly seems to favor different protection for the papers of
culpable and non-culpable individuals. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
I" But see McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The
Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 INDIANA L.J. 55, 72 (1977), in which
the author argues that "a higher standard of protection [for private papers] can be
obtained through a more stringent application of the fourth amendment's procedural
requirements:' Although the term "private papers" is not defined in that article, it
appears that the notion of private papers in that article is broader than "communica-
tions to oneself." See id. at 55 n.l.
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A rule allowing the police, upon a double showing of probable
cause, to search for and seize private papers would be consistent with
the balance already struck by the fourth amendment in relation to
arrests. Currently, once the police have probable cause that an individ-
ual has committed a crime, the individual's privacy rights become sub-
ject to serious limitation. Upon such a showing the suspect can be
arrested, searched incident to that arrest, fingerprinted, booked,
jailed, indicted, and tried. It is commensurate with these limitations
also to allow the "arrest" of the suspect's thoughts in the form of sei-
zure of his or her private papers. On the other hand, the private papers
of the person as to whom the police cannot .demonstrate probable
cause of culpability should be immune from seizure or subpoena
under all circumstances.1 5
The Court has on at least one occasion since Boyd recognized the
special position of private papers. In Sinclair v. United States,"6 in the
context of a consideration of the limitations upon congressional inves-
tigations, the Court observed:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance
or more essential to his peace or happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of
his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of oth-
ers. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights
would lose half their value.'
The leading case supporting a right of mental or psychological
privacy, which is the basis of the double-probable-cause rule, is Stanley
,05 Under the proposed rule newspaper reporters and doctors, provided they are
not accused of crime, could not be the subject of a search or subpoena for their pri-
vate communications to themselves. But the rule would allow the police to seize the
calendar/diary of a foreign agent showing payoffs to congressmen or the diary of a
murderer which indicated where he or she planned to strike next, upon a showing of
probable cause to arrest that person in addition to the usual probable cause to search.
306 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
,"Id. at 292-93, quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 E 241, 250 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1887). See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1965), where the Court
relied on Entick to posit a special constitutional protection for books and impliedly
papers "when the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain!'
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v. Georgia.'8 In Stanley federal and state agents entered appellant's
home, pursuant to a search warrant, to search for evidence of book-
making activity. Although they found little such evidence, they did
find obscene films, and appellant was ultimately convicted for posses-
sion of those films. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court
held that the combination of the intrusion into the privacy of the home
and the violation of the "right to receive information and ideas"'' 0 9 led
to the conclusion that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.""0
Of course, Stanley did not involve any direct attempt on the part of
the government to control minds. The state of Georgia merely wanted
to seize obscene materials in Stanley's home. But it was the Court's
recognition that these materials constituted the input for one's mental
processes which led to the conclusion that the government's power to
intrude must be restrained. And just as Stanley protected mental
input, mental output must also be protected if the mind is to function
freely. Both the input and output unite to form the complete physical
manifestation of the thinking process, a sphere of privacy into which
governmental intrusion must be carefully circumscribed.
The narrow holding of Stanley, however, was limited to seizures
of private literature in the home and was motivated as much by a spe-
cial concern for the privacy of the home as it was by the right to
receive information. That is, this right to mental input depended upon
fourth as well as first amendment values, and mental input was pro-
tected only in the privacy of one's own home.'I
The importance of the government's invasion of the home to the
Court's holding in Stanley was underscored by Paris Adult Theaters I
v. Slaton.III In that case the Court limited Stanley by holding that,
although the government cannot control thoughts or arrest people for
mere possession of obscene material in their homes, it can control peo-
108 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"'1 Id. at 564.
110 Id. at 565.
"I The Court invalidated the conviction by striking down the Georgia statute
which forbade knowing possession of obscene materials. But the Court said, "If the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch." Id. (emphasis added).
-12 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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pie's access to obscene movies and books." 3 Because such control of
input obviously has an effect on thinking, Stanley became primarily a
limitation on the power to seize materials, not the power to control
access to information." ' Similarly, "private" writings which are
intended to be seen by others or which are kept in a place not personal
to the author, such as an office accessible to other workers or in the
hands of a third party, do not have sufficient trappings of expression
of one's innermost personal thoughts to be subject to any special con-
stitutional protections. Only communications to oneself kept in a spe-
cial sphere of privacy should be so protected.
How will this sphere of privacy be protected by the proposed
rule? Suppose a search warrant directs the search for and seizure of
"all records" relating to a certain, allegedly fraudulent, real estate
transaction.'" Several closed file drawers containing numerous
papers, some prepared by the suspect, some by his secretary, some by
his employees, and some by his business associates are in the suspect's
office. The double-probable-cause rule proposed here would protect
from seizure only those papers prepared personally by the defendant
and kept for his or her private use, such as tape recorded notes or a
calendar/diary.
Although the rule is simple, its application is not. An appoint-
ment calendar may or may not have been used solely by the defendant.
A typewritten paper in a file marked "personal" may have been pre-
pared by the defendant, a secretary, or an employee. But the proposed
rule, without attempting to distinguish between personal and business
papers, preserves the value it is designed to protect, the individual's
'3Id. at 67.
"4 See also Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973), where the seizure of mate-
rials which were "arguably" protected by the first amendment created a higher stand-
ard of "reasonableness" under the fourth amendment. Id. at 504.
'5 This example is similar to the warrant approved by the Supreme Court in
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
116 Any rule of law, such as that suggested by Justice Brennan concurring in
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 414, 426-27, and Justice Marshall dissenting in
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 350, which extends greater constitutional protec-
tion to papers which are "personal" than to those of a "business" nature is doomed
to failure. In order for the authorities to determine whether a given paper is of a
personal or business nature they would have to read it, thus breaching the privacy
which the rule was designed to protect. Furthermore, some of the papers most wor-
1981]
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freedom from government intrusion. The rule bases the distinction
between seizable and protected papers on two factors which may be
determined without perusal of the papers involved: the way in which
the materials are stored" 7 and the culpability of the subject to the
search.
When a subject is culpable, the police, upon a double showing of
probable cause, can search for anything. When a subject is not culp-
able, the formula is more complicated. If the materials are stored in an
area which appears to be a private enclave of the subject, such as a
desk drawer or a file marked "personal" or "private," there must be a
presumption that any papers contained therein are "communications
to oneself" by the subject." 8 Before such items, belonging to a
non-culpable individual, may be seized, the warrant must reflect prob-
able cause' 9 that the material in such a file is not a private "communi-
thy of protection, such as reporters' and doctors' notes, are clearly "business" papers
and would not be protected.
" Any rule based solely on the place in which private papers are stored, rather
than on the individual's intention to keep them private, would permit criminal sus-
pects to thwart searches by keeping all incriminating papers in files marked "private."
I" The physical areas which would be protected by the rule formulated in this
article are much narrower than all the areas in which one might have a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment. The standard in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), for example, may protect an expectation of privacy in
hotel rooms, offices, and other semi-private areas. However, the expectation of pri-
vacy under Katz is the ability to admit only whom one chooses. Conversely, the
expectation of privacy under the rule proposed in this article is grounded on the own-
er's intention that no one have access to the area. The protection of this proposed rule
would be limited to areas which are for the most part completely private, and which
are not used by anyone other than the person in question. This rule would protect a
closed desk or file cabinet used by one person but located in an otherwise public
office.
"I This probable cause requirement is simply a corollary of the rule that a war-
rant must reflect probable cause to search the area in fact searched; areas not named
in a valid warrant remain protected. The double probable cause rule proposed here
elevates private papers to the status of a separate area in which an individual has a
separate legitimate expectation of privacy. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
13 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979), the Supreme Court
held that a warrant was required to search luggage found in automobiles because lug-
gage is where personal effects are stored. Because private papers are where an individ-
ual's most private thoughts are stored, an area which appears to contain private
papers, like an object which appears to contain personal effects, should remain pro-
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cation to oneself," but is instead a communication to which others
have access.' This is admittedly a standard which police will fre-
quently be unable to meet.
In many cases, non-culpable subjects, such as reporters, will be
able to avoid police intrusion by storing everything in files marked
"personal!' But this tactic will not always be successful. For example,
in Zurcher the police were seeking photographs.' These would be
seizable regardless of where they were filed. And even if they were
stored in a personal file, the police could have obtained the photo-
graphs without reading any of the private papers which may have also
been in the file. Similarly, if the warrant calls for seizure of a letter, the
police can look in a file drawer marked "personal" in order to deter-
mine the nature of the papers therein while not actually reading them
and seize the file folders containing correspondence.' 22 Furthermore,
tected by a separate requirement of probable cause even when located in an area
where a valid search is taking place.
"20 Thus for the police to be able to search the files of a non-culpable individual
which appear to be private, they would have to demonstrate in advance that the
papers in such files were not the subject's communications to oneself. In the case of
such matters as letters, contracts, and blueprint files such a showing would be rela-
tively easy to make. A search of a personal memo file, on the other hand, would be
impermissible. In the case of private and non-private papers mixed together, the
police would have to demonstrate that the search could be made without reading the
private papers.
"' Admittedly, not to apply the double-probable-cause rule to photographs is to
give somewhat short shrift to the artistic content of a photograph which is arguably
as much a product of the photographer's mind as would be a writer's description of
the same scene. But the written word is always an expression of thoughts, while a
photograph is always a mechanical reproduction of a scene to which others, presum-
ably, have or have had access. Similarly, a reporter's tape recording of an interview is
a mechanical reproduction of a conversation to which another person was privy.
However, when the reporter goes back and dictates his or her impressions of the inter-
view or even his or her attempt at verbatim reconstruction, human and not mechani-
cal reproduction is involved, and such a tape recording would be a communication to
oneself. An impressionist painting would pose a difficult case indeed. Fortunately
these are rarely the object of a search where the artist is the subject of the search, and
are almost always meant to be seen by others.
,22 While such a scheme may be subject to abuse by police it is not without prec-
edent. Currently, under wiretapping warrants police are required to minimize the
extent to which they monitor non-pertinent calls. 18 U.S.C. §,2517(5) (1976). But see
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), in which some overhearing of personal
19811
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the individual who has supplied the police the necessary information
as to the location of the papers will frequently be able to attest to their
non-private nature. No doubt cases will arise where valuable evidence
must be foregone, but the gain to the privacy interests of people not
themselves involved in crimes will be substantial. 23
Of course, like any comprehensive formulation, the rule
advanced in this Article is fraught with potential problems and unan-
swered questions. For example, consider the case of a reporter who
has shown his or her notes only to an editor. Such notes would no
longer be considered purely private. This is not to say that the reporter
cannot discuss the substance of the notes with an editor or that the
notes might not in some way be protected by the first amendment or
the Privacy Protection Act,' 24 but they can no longer be said to be
merely communications to oneself. Incorporation of the notes in a
story would not, however, render the notes themselves any less pri-
vate."'25
calls was found not to render the wiretap unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
In a wiretap case it is impossible for the subject to know if the police have adhered to
their mandate unless they admit a breach. But in a search, if the subject of the search
or his or her agent is present he or she can observe whether the police merely take a
cursory glance at the papers in the "personal" file or stop to read them. The problem
is no greater than the possibility that the police will exceed the scope of a warrant in
the usual search.
" One can conceive of a situation where the culpable individual might attempt
to thwart law enforcement efforts by transferring his records to a non-culpable indi-
vidual for storage in files marked personal. This expedient would not work because
once the files were transferred their personal privacy characteristics would be gone.
Furthermore, if the materials were seized from another, the transferor might be una-
ble to protest the seizure under Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
"' Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1978 (1980) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa).
See text accompanying notes 128-39 infra.
What if a reporter's notes are improperly seized and used against a defendant
who gave the reporter information? Under current standing law the defendant's
inability to assert a privacy interest in the reporter's notes would cause his exclu-
sionary claim to be disallowed. In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), cer-
tain documents were illegally seized by federal agents from one Wolstencroft and
introduced into evidence at the criminal trial of respondent Payner. The Court held
that Payner had no standing to assert the unconstitutional seizure of the documents
and the courts could not exercise their supervisory powers to exclude them. The
appropriate remedy would be to allow the party whose privacy has been violated to
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Practical problems will arise in distinguishing these protected
papers from those that are seizable, and the police may be required to
make some fine distinctions on the scene. However, the proposed rule
should not be prohibitively difficult to administer because in this
regard it is consistent with current law.'2 6 It should be no more diffi-
cult to determine whether private papers were illegally seized than to
determine whether other materials are fruits of an unreasonable
search, and illegally seized private papers, like other fruits of unrea-
sonable searches, could not be used in evidence or as leads.'
2 7
Finally, it should be noted that protection for private papers must
be constitutional rather than statutory. In response to Zurcher, Con-
enjoin the use of the notes and seek their return by writ of mandamus. If he or she
chose not to do so then the defendant would be without a remedy.
The Supreme Court has not confronted the issue of whether evidence, illegally
seized from X, can be used against Y even in the face of a successful or pending civil
action by X for the return of the evidence. However, Payner, which found no stand-
ing for a defendant to protest the seizure of another person's papers, suggests that Y
could not protest if X were subpoenaed to Y's trial, ordered to bring the documents,
and compelled to authenticate them under a grant of immunity.
But Payner does not confront the problem discussed in this Article: X's privacy
interest in his papers and X's (rather than Y's) standing to challenge use of the papers
in any trial. Because that interest would be defeated by the use of the papers in the
public trial of Y, it follows that X has standing to prevent their use at such a trial or,
for that matter, any other use or exposure of his papers by the authorities, including
calling X to testify as to the contents of such papers or subpoenaing the papers them-
selves. Any other result would completely defeat the ability of a reporter or doctor to
protect the privacy of his notes since they would usually be sought not as evidence
against the subject of the search but as evidence against a third party.
,26 If the police do not conform to the requirements of the double probable
cause rule the evidence must be excluded. Thus, if the police execute a search warrant
for a private diary without the requisite showing of double probable cause, the diary
may not be used in evidence, even if probable cause existed at the time the warrant
was issued but was simply not included in the warrant.
If a communication to oneself is accidentally seized in connection with a legiti-
mate search or found in plain view it must be returned, and not used in evidence.
However, the plain view must not be such as to dispel the individual's expectations of
exclusive privacy. Thus a diary lying on the public sidewalk could be read by any
passerby and is no longer protected by the double probable cause rule. On the other
hand, a diary sitting on a night table, discovered by police while executing a search
warrant, would be protected.
,'2 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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gress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980.128 The stated pur-
pose of the Act is to "limit governmental search and seizure of docu-
mentary materials possessed by persons ... "' Title I of the Act
provides in part that it shall be unlawful for any "government officer
or employee to search for or seize any work product materials [or doc-
umentary materials] possessed by a person" involved in a first amend-
ment activity.' 29 Title II of the Act directs the Attorney General to issue
guidelines to be followed by federal employees when seeking to obtain
documentary materials from a person not a suspect in a crime.'30 The
guidelines' 3 ' provide that a search warrant should not be used unless
less intrusive alternative means "would substantially jeopardize the
availability or usefulness of the materials sought"'
Although on its face the Act protects "all materials on which
information is recorded," 33 its protection may prove to be much less.
The Act seeks to protect the materials of persons involved in first
amendment activities from search and seizure by state and local, as
well as federal, government officials, 3' with Congress asserting juris-
"I3 Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa).
229 Id. § 101(a). "Work product materials" are defined in section 107(b). They
are more clearly described in the House Conference Report as "those documentary
materials whose very creation arises out of the purpose of conveying information to
the public and which involve some measure of original contribution on the part of the
person whose intent is that the materials be disseminated to the public" H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 96-1411, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3972, 3973. "Documentary materials" are all materials on which informa-
tion is recorded, but do not include contraband or fruits or instrumentalities of a
crime. Pub. L. No. 96440, § 107(a), 94 Stat. 1879.
120 Id. § 201(a).
' Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third
Parties, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,362 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.FR. § 59).
2 Id. at 22,365.
" Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 107(a), 94 Stat. 1879. The Act would thus extend to
many materials, for example, the photographs in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978), whose evidentiary value would outweigh the interference with the first
amendment activity. See id. at 563-67.
"I Although the Act never defines "government officer or employee," it is clear
that state and local officials are included within its provisions. Section 101(a) pro-
vides protection from searches by "a government officer or employee" Section
106(a) grants a federal cause of action for damages to persons aggrieved by a viola-
tion of the Act "against the United States, against a State.. . , or against any other
governmental unit,... and against an officer or employee of a State...."
[Vol. 16
Protection for Private Papers
diction over state and local officials under the commerce clause.' For
this reason the Act may be unconstitutional under National League of
Cities v. Usery,'36 in which the Supreme Court held that Congress has
no power under the commerce clause to "directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
ment functions:' 37 If National League of Cities applies, the protection
afforded by any federal statute is severely limited because most
searches are undertaken by state and local, rather than federal,
authorities.
Even if the Act is constitutional, the protection it affords private
papers is limited. Although Title I protects private papers possessed by
persons involved in first amendment activities, it offers no protection
to private papers held by anyone else, including other professionals,
such as doctors and lawyers. The guidelines promulgated under Title
II do grant special consideration to materials pertaining to profes-
sional, confidential relationships,' 38 but Title II applies only to federal
officials, and even that protection is far from absolute. The materials
covered by Title II can be the object of a subpoena, and may even be
searched for and seized, if the requirements of the guidelines are
met. 139
Conclusion
In the years since the mere evidence rule was abolished, the
Supreme Court has methodically diminished the constitutional protec-
tions applicable to private papers, holding that a search for and seizure
'1 See id. § 101(a).
136 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
'31 Id. at 852. The area of "police protection" was specifically mentioned by the
Court as such a function. Id. at 851. Strictly construed, of course, National League
of Cities was concerned with Congressional intrusion on the states' employer-
employee relationships only. But the principle behind the decision, that Congress'
power under the commerce clause does not reach functions traditionally performed
by state governments, remains for further application by the Court.
31 46 Fed. Reg. 22,365.
139 Id. These materials are obtainable by search warrant if "[i]t appears" that less
intrusive means "would substantially jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the
materials sought," access to the materials "appears to be of substantial importance to
the investigation," and the search warrant is approved by a Deputy Assistant Attor-
nev Generil 7"d
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of certain papers does not violate the self-incrimination prohibition of
the fifth amendment, 40 that certain papers may be subpoenaed from
one's attorney,"4' and that a non-culpable third party who possesses
evidentiary material may be the subject of a search and seizure.'42 Yet
the Court has consistently and explicitly refrained from holding that
these lessened protections would be applicable to the most private of
papers such as a diary.14 The Court's restraint is undoubtedly moti-
vated by an awareness that private papers occupy a special position in
the spectrum of social values.
To date, the government lacks the capacity to read or record our
thoughts. But given the limitations of the human brain, many
thoughts, often fleeting and impermanent, are of little import unless
they are recorded. In Stanley v. Georgia, 141 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the right of the individual to read whatever he or she likes, i.e.,
to have mental input, in the privacy of the home. This Article seeks a
completion of the sphere of privacy begun by Stanley. Just as mental
input is protected in Stanley, so should mental output be protected.
The individual who is not involved in criminal activity should be able
to record his or her private thoughts with the assurance that they will
never become the subject of legal process. Only if one voluntarily dis-
closes one's thoughts to another, thus destroying their purely private
nature, or opens oneself up to the significant intrusions upon privacy
to which involvement in criminal activity gives rise, should one's com-
munications to oneself be subject to seizure.
140 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 465 (1976).
'1' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
1' Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
S See text accompanying notes 7-8, 57-62, & 77 supra.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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